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     Ambiguity is a cultural phenomenon. In a synchronic perspective, it is a 
reaction of established intelligence to what is out of control, and it depends on social 
conventions for its definition. Diachronically, ambiguity happens in a specific temporal-
spatial situation, and what is clear or unclear changes constantly with time and place. 
Conflation of the two visions into a cognitive panorama so as to work out a schema 
with universal applicability is a pre-linguistic, metaphysical illusion, a copy of the 
Hegelian 'unity of logic and history.' 
     Ambiguity in this article refers to several social happenings on the mainland of 
China during the 1990s. I will suspend mention of diachronic instances during this 
period, mentioning them only when it is necessary. Thus, ambiguity is defined in the 
following context as the semantic effect of a deliberate or non-intentional juxtaposition 
of different forms, styles, ideas and even political ideologies within an identical text, 
which renders reductionism, in terms of meaning attribution, extremely difficult. This 
postmodern collage, anachronistic as it appears to be, has fast become a national 
penchant since the early 1990s, creating a lifestyle and generating disparate responses 
in Chinese academic circles. Like it or not, distancing from clarity works quite well in 
everyday life and disturbs both conservative nostalgia and liberal radicalism. 
      To verify this argument, I have selected two events, among many others, from 
real life, and I hope that their re-presentation might illustrate how ambiguity is 
dismantling the conventional interpretative hierarchy, and undermining value standards 
prescribed by the ruling ideology. One event comes from the pop culture while the 
other relates to the official strategy for ideological inculcation. They represent, in a 
symbolic way, the naive and the sophisticated, or individual and public authority. 
Neither of the above is able to resist the temptation of ambiguity as a re-structuring 
force in Chinese social life. The two events will further be exposed to a semiotic vision, 
and then an epistemological survey in order to show how they, as postmodern artifacts, 
dramatize an on-going cultural re-identification in the drive for material modernization. 
In the Epilogue, I shall try to put a limit on the legitimacy of the ambiguity by placing it 
within a wider context.
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Event One: Misplacement of Symbols
     In the weekend page of a Guangzhou-centered but nationally distributed 
newspaper Yang Cheng Evening for Nov.10, 1996, an interesting article appeared under 
the title of "Misplacement as a Fashion." It juxtaposes two true stories from real life, 
both concerning fashion shows. The first show was organized by hand picked top 
students---morally and intellectually good boys and girls---from one of the best high 
schools in Guangzhou as a special performance dedicated to the yearly Science and Art 
Festival. Students acted as models, displaying new school uniforms designed by 
themselves to promote not only school discipline but also spiritual civilization under 
Chinese socialism. The schoolmaster was very much worried about the potential 
effectiveness of the new design, because he knew there was nothing new, let alone 
sensational, in the design, though his chief responsibility was to guarantee the students' 
moral purity and ideological fidelity. Contrary to his pessimistic anticipation, however, 
the show came through with flying colors. Excitement shook the hall when the student 
models walked in, accompanied by Madonna's sensual song 'Like a Virgin.' Auntie 
Madonna's appealingly sexy voice neutralized the monotonous conformity encoded in 
the uniforms, presenting an audio-visual spectacle in which God and Devil, so to speak, 
danced together. The schoolmaster did not catch the point of the song because the 
English words were unintelligible to him. The music sounded like commonplace disco. 
For these students who fed on MTV mish mash as daily nourishment, there was nothing 
really fresh or imaginative in the show. It had been great fun and nothing else. 
     The second show was professional and commercial. Beautiful female bodies, 
dressed in wildly styled bikinis as explosive and colorful as bursting bombs, weaved 
back and forth on the stage. With a gentle but highly seductive smile, each girl wore a 
Red Army cap and stepped to the tempo of a familiar revolutionary battle song 
originally composed to stir up class-consciousness on the part of poor peasant women, 
and to consolidate their communist ideal. What a shocking juxtaposition! Just think of 
the strong French and American reaction to the film 'The Last Temptation of Christ' and 
one can imagine the possible impact of the show upon Chinese moral/political 
conventions. Yet this collage of two mutually excluding codes proved no less 
successful. Incidentally, no censorship came from the ideological authorities. Here is 
the journalist's commentary: 
     "I am at a loss to say anything positive or negative. I just have a feeling that the 
bikini and 'Like a Virgin' should go together, while the Red Army cap matches the new 
school uniform well. Of course, this is merely my suggestion. I know misplacement of 
symbols has become the Fashion in China."
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Event Two: Neo-San Zi Jing
     San Zi Jing, analogous in function to the Christian catechism, is a Confucian 
canon prepared in the form of doggerel or nursery rhymes with a view to instilling 
moral regulations into innocent, naive minds. Each line comprises three Chinese 
ideograms (San=three, Zi=ideograms or characters), so that it is easy for children to 
commit the Jing (canon text) to memory. Moral preaching underlines the content, and 
the first two lines present an assumption on which the whole ethic-political edifice of 
Confucianism is based: "In the beginning/Human nature is good." 
     Here is an anthropological horizon in which original sin and class consciousness 
are absolutely missing. Such text runs counter to the Marxist canon, and consequently 
has to be dismissed, if not completely eliminated, from Chinese consciousness. To 
follow (post) structuralist terminology, the San Zi Jing can be regarded as a 
marginalized event far away from the center of the predominant structure. 
     Then another event occurred in 1995, a project sponsored by the Propaganda 
Department of the Party Committee of Guangdong Province that was implemented by 
instructors as well as professors from Zhongshan University where I am employed. It is 
called Neo-San Zi Jing. 
     This new canon is much more ambitious in the sense that it manages to 
conglomerate a large variety of subjects or themes concerning human history, 
cognition, ethics, law, literature and art, modern science and technology, and even 
ecological conservation. This arrangement of content disregards the modern division of 
disciplines, jumbles together diverse classes of information, and makes the text 
superficially interdisciplinary. It fails to bring all the fragmented topics to a narrative 
unity, leaving each at the level of 'surface meaning,' as Foucault would have it, without 
any unique depth as a cohesive force. As for its structure, the new canon maintains the 
established form: three words in each line, which constitutes the basic narrative unit. 
But, in contrast to the original, there is no logical connection between one unit and 
another, and the montage jumps freely across space and time. As a matter of fact, not a 
single unit can work logically as 'The Word' or as metadiscourse to regulate the 
signification of the whole text. Meaning emerges only in the interaction and 
counteraction between different lines with different meanings, depending on the reader 
(teacher and student) for its fixation. This structural deployment, it seems to me, 
perfectly meets post-ideological needs in China: an imaginary convergence of different 
master concepts or 'grand narratives,' as Lyotard would have it --classical Marxism, 
Confucianism, Deng Xiao-ping's innovation, science and technology, market economy, 
democracy, etc. -hoping for a new grand narrative, but without grandness. Shall we
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call it grand eclecticism in parallel with populist eclecticism? In passing, the project has 
made big money in the local market, a sharp contrast to more conventional money 
consuming ideological campaigns. 
     Response to this postmodern kaleidoscopic event varies according to the 
receivers' hermeneutic fore-structures. Local state-manipulated mass media hail it as 
another success in developing spiritual civilization under Chinese socialism; 
Enlightenment addled intellectuals regard it as a laughing stock and keep a safe 
distance from any discussions or meetings on its significance; modernity-oriented 
critics make a big story out of one or two unconventional or incorrect word usages 
though they are not as fastidious about the ungrammaticality in modernistic literature; 
students get a new type of textbook not necessarily generating a sense of spiritual 
sublimation, but surely less dull than older texts in terms of ideological infusion; 
Marxist fundamentalists, small in number and out of power but potentially influential, 
might consider it yet another blasphemy and deplore the violence it does to the purity 
of Marxism. Co-existing in an identical milieu, the disparate textual elements combine 
to symbolize a new mode of communication in Chinese public life: the sender can no 
longer control, as he or she once had, the interpretation of the message. 
     More thought provoking is the fact that the project-designers and their co-
operators from the university, as far as I know, were not interested at all in post-
modernism. Some might even hate the term. This paradox testifies to a postmodern 
argument that cultural industry is not controlled by its workers any more than its 
products are the 'objectivation' (Vergegenstandlichung) of a spiritual force emanating 
from the subject or producer, but are a multi-layered text of 'intersubjectivity.' It 
signifies 'the demise of the author,' as Roland Barthes put it. He or she is decentered. 
The relevance of Barthes' idea to modern Chinese reading conventions which tend to be 
manipulated by one sub-divine author or another should never be overestimated. It is 
not a laughing stock but a remarkable mutation.
A Semiotic Vision 
        At first glance, the two events are different: one conflates the noble and the 
obscene into what Russian Formalism called 'carnival' while the other attempts to 
integrate diametrically opposed master concepts. In a semiotic vision, however, we can 
find an identical strategy for meaning creation. Both neglect conventional syntax and 
grammar, project incompatible paradigms on a synchronic screen, and construct an 
unfamiliar sequence of signs To put it another way, in a sign system involving master 
concepts or grand narratives, individual elements are used somewhat as pure signifiers
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through suspension of their initial signifieds which are then attached to new meanings 
(signifieds) which have yet to be anchored. The result is an ungrammatical sentence 
that estranges us from what is familiar, and shocks the orthodox-minded into an 
awareness of something derivative and challenging. Another result is a new pattern of 
communication, which demands a non-conventional reading in order to decipher its 
code system. The text lacks clarity because it violates ideological purity and puts 
conventional criteria in a dilemma. But, ambiguity arises not so much from a failure to 
follow the Law of Contradiction as from the foregrounding of a symbiosis of different 
elements in our life space. In this sense, ambiguity only offends logicalized common 
sense, not life itself. This is why our students reacted to the fashion show as great fun 
and nothing else, or less dull. As for the various negative reactions, they presuppose 
ideologies that attempt to divide life into what is acceptable and what is not. 
     To highlight its pertinence to the structural transformation of Chinese cultural 
life, it might be useful to recall Barthes' theory and give a brief account of his textual 
semiotics. In Mythologies and Elements of Semiology, Roland Barthes used a simplified 
version of the glossematic sign model developed by Hjelmslev, founder of the 
Copenhagen School of Linguistics. In contrast to Saussure, Barthes defined a sign as a 
system consisting of an 'expression' (E, corresponding to signifier) in relation (R) to a 
'content' (C
, corresponding to signified). A primary sign system E1R1C1 can become 
an element of a more complicated sign system. When change takes place in content, 
that is, the signified, the primary sign system becomes the expression, that is, the 
signifier of a secondary sign system. Then, we have E2(=E 1 R 1 C 1)R2C2. The primary 
is called 'denotative' and the secondary 'connotative.' Barthes described the system of 
secondary meaning as 'myth' and this sphere of connotation as an 'ideology.' The mass 
media, propaganda and advertisement alike, according to Barthes, tend to conceal the 
nature of the secondary, connotative systems by making their messages sound or look 
primary, thus innocent, and by giving them a natural and eternal justification. A much-
quoted example is a cover photo from the French magazine Paris-Match published in 
the mid-1950s. Picture (E) presents, that is, denotes, "a black African in a French 
uniform saluting a French flag"(C). But, behind this primary, denotative sign system 
E 1 R 1 C 1, there exists the implicit yet strong connotation of a C2 that 'France is a great 
colonial Empire with loyal black citizens in its army.' Obviously, this is the commonest 
way in which ruling ideologies everywhere in the world create myths for the purpose of 
manipulating people's minds and regulating their behaviors. 
     For the benefit of comparison and contrast, let us call this modern text semiotics. 
We can see that semiosis--the action of signs--as expressed in Barthes' case studies is, 
to a certain extent, premeditated, and the deconstruction of a myth takes place in the
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reader's critical mind which is more or less independent of the text. The basic strategy 
of modern myth, on the other hand, is to resort to a single master concept or grand 
narrative to produce illusions. It does not offend the reading convention and appeals to 
human conscious tendency to accept anything grammatical. The Chinese people are not 
unfamiliar with this type of myth. It had its heyday during the Cultural Revolution. 
Postmodern Semiosis, however, presents another picture, as I have demonstrated in the 
above two events. Lacking a master concept to control the text, it undermines the 
accepted grammar, upsets the reading convention, and generates a strange syntagmatic 
sequence in which meaning, either denotative or connotative, is at once differed and 
deferred, a postmodern phenomenon that Derrida calls 'differance'. Here, opposites are 
mingled, the sacred is profaned, the indecent is made sacred, the monistic reductionism 
of interpretation is undercut, and the jolly relativity of all things, as Bakhtin would have 
it, is proclaimed. It is the text's self-deconstruction or semantic indeterminacy that 
touches the subliminal of both the author and the reader. A modem myth in the sense of 
Barthes' text semiotics cannot be established in this postmodern semiosis. Of course, 
collage is not a phenomenon unique to what we call postmodern age: we can find many 
similar cases in modern and pre-modem Chinese literature. I describe it as postmodern 
only because the mixing up of different code systems has become a fashion, and the 
mass production and wholesaling of mosaic artifacts has become a reality, which is re-
shaping our lifestyle and affecting our intellectual activities. It parallels Chinese avant-
garde literature and art, but exerts a direct, immediate and much more powerful 
influence upon people's verbal/non-verbal behaviors, cultivating an environment of 
ideological plurality which theoretical criticism and student demonstration wished for, 
but failed to achieve during the 1980s.
An Epistemological Survey 
     Ambiguity as a problem is not merely a reaction to a monologue stage-managed 
by the predominant ideology. It is also a matter of cognition or of semiotics itself. In a 
Saussurean framework, semiosis refers to the differentiating movement of signs within 
a relatively closed system. Signification, the process of signifying, depends solely on a 
formal and hierarchical arrangement of opposites, suspending the significance of 
individual speakers and extra-linguistic social context, context that stands for 
specifically pragmatic situations and works as another necessary condition---together 
with la langue--- for successful communication. In a closed system, clarity gains from 
the maintenance of one element and the exclusion of the other. Ambiguity arises when 
what has been marginalized comes back. The point here is not that clarity and
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ambiguity are the two sides of binarism, but that binarism itself is a construct or 
theoretically-camouflaged desire for order, not necessarily equivalent to reality. 
'Interpretant
,' the third term in Charles S. Peirce's semiotic framework which constitutes 
another sign and logically involves another system of signs or language game, but 
which always takes a specific individual interpreter for its actualization in the activity 
of interpretation, it is seemingly irrelevant to structuralism. Yet it does work, though in 
the disguise of the transcendental, Kantian, or more problematically, the universal 
subject of Hegel. Saussure, in his Course in General Linguistics, knows quite well that 
there is a limit to the synchronic approach and that one step further leads to the absurd. 
Unfortunately, in linguistic determinism---a logical fallacy that develops la langue as a 
necessary condition into a sufficient or necessarily sufficient condition for the 
possibility of communication--- language obtains an ontological status in spite of the 
efforts made by Greimas and Umberto Eco to deflate this metaphysical desire'. It is an 
extension of the classical Marxist proposal that 'being determines thinking': language is 
being, and language is structure or, as poststructuralists and deconstructionists might 
say, an endless process of structuring along the 'trace.' The latter does not really 
transcend Saussure's theoretical vision. At each ring along the 'no-beginning and no-
ending chain' of the Derridean 'trace,' there exists a structuralist arrangement of 
opposites, though the next ring undermines the proceeding one, which makes 
'differance' possible.2 Clarity remains legitimate within each hierarchical substructure. 
When theorists/critics turn to history or social practice, they take as their objects of 
study other texts and re-adopt a synchronic approach so as to locate something a 
priori.3 Structuralism dies hard. Saussure plays the role of a 20th century Kant.4 
     It is against this background that ambiguity is the necessary sacrifice-
necessary, first cognitively and then ethically-at the altar of the true and the good. 
When poststructuralism stirred up a debate on determinacy/indeterminacy, it not only 
challenged conventional cognitive science and moral philosophy but also brought an 
impertinent problem into the field of literary criticism. Either in the Greek sense of 
aesthetics or in the Kantian sense of indeterminate or reflective judgment, as in 'The 
Third Critique,' ambiguity is the very life of art and literature. Literary argumentation 
oriented around the determinacy/indeterminacy alternative is somewhat strange and 
misleading. It tends to shift away from the literature itself, even though we have to 
define what literature is in different historical periods. The debate--many participants 
are literary critics--has reduced the problem of the beautiful to the problem of the true. 
Dismantling the philosophical edifice gives rise to the epistemologizing of aesthetics. 
When confronted with an artistic work or poem, one no longer asks how beautiful it is, 
but what it means, or what political or moral messages it connotes through structuralist
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analysis or deconstructionist procedure. To put it in another way, when one reads 
philosophy, that is, clarity, as literature, that is, as ambiguity, as Derrida prefers, the 
latter merges into the former. Critical of a time-honored Platonic assumption that 
philosophy is superior to poetry, we come back to Plato in the end. Literature prevails 
by identifying itself with epistemology. Of course, this is not the deconstructionism that 
Derrida's Chinese followers understand. To them, deconstruction is to turn the hierarchy 
upside down regardless of the fact that the result is also a hierarchy. This explains how 
and why conservatives and liberals, hostile to each other in many respects, share an 
identical pattern of cognition when they try to devaluate the two events presented above 
on the basis of moral or political ambiguity. Such Chinese logic indicates that European 
binarism has largely obscured the significance of the traditional Yin-Yang logic, 
another construct according to which Yang marginalizes itself by marginalizing Yin and 
vice versa: a self-destruction rather than deconstruction. A healthy order in the 
universe, including human life, it assumes, lies somewhere, though constantly in a 
process of re-adjustment, between order and chaos. Such logic is ambiguous in nature 
but not in the sense of the clarity/ambiguity dichotomy. Such logic is the manifestation 
of what is called the Great Tao that stays beyond the reach of linguistic explanation. 
The Tao is immanent like God but not transcendent as God is supposed to be. Since 
what can be stated is not the eternal Tao which only manifests itself in various Yin-
Yang movements, even though we employ a signifier 'Tao' to state it, the linguistic or 
any other semiotic expression referring to it only serves as a provisional device, 
something like Wittgenstein's 'ladder' that has to be thrown away after use. Absolute 
mysticism, Kant might respond, belongs to the thing-in-itself or the noumenal, and has 
to be excluded from the theory of knowledge. And that is exactly what has happened in 
Chinese intellectual life. Ambiguity has got some bad credit: cognitively confused and 
confusing, morally and politically irresponsible. 
     It has to be emphasized that post-structuralist shaping of the Chinese mind does 
not start with the introduction of Saussure and Derrida into China any more than 
binarism is the invention of 20th century European intelligence. Long ago, Spinoza 
formulated the principle that all 'determination is negation.' To determine a thing is to 
cut it off from some sphere of being and so to limit it. To define is to set boundaries. 
Affirmation inevitably involves negation. This amounts to saying that one defines 
something - that is, reaching clarity - by excluding what it is not: a hallmark of 
structuralist methodology with respect to meaning creation. Drawing upon Spinoza but 
breaking the limit set by formal logic, Hegel took the converse idea that all 'negation is 
determination.' To deny that a thing belongs to one class is to affirm that it belongs to 
some other class, though we may not know which - or still feel uncertain about - what
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that class is. Putting the above two statements together, we have the very beginning of 
what is now called 'negative definition,' a method frequently used in contemporary 
theories of criticism. It seems, so far, that positive and negative or clarity and ambiguity 
are correlatives that mutually involve each other. Problems arise again when attempts 
are made to set up a hierarchy of thesis versus antithesis by placing them in a sequence 
of time and provide a solution in synthesis through the mystic sublation. 
     Hegelian-Marxist 'sublation' is interpreted, at least in Leninism and Maoism, as 
the destruction of the one by the other. "One eats up the other," as Mao used to say. In 
everyday Chinese books, as well as in high school text books, the hierarchy is described 
as the opposition, and the solution to it is sugar-coated, tasting like poetry: 'unity in 
diversity.' In real life, opposition means exclusion and unity monologue! Obviously, this 
understanding of reality has serious political, ethical and aesthetic consequences, 
sometimes bloody. The suppression of ambiguity, the co-existence of different code 
systems, is far more than semiotic trivialities locked in an academic ivory tower. When 
the notion of 'Difference is not opposition,' in the sense of Lyotard, finds legal 
expression in overwhelming artifacts, a new 'paradigm,' as Kuhn would have it, will 
prevails.
A Mutation under Way 
     What I want to bring home in the above paragraph is a historical fact that long 
before the Cultural Revolution and even before the founding of the Republic in 1949, 
the idea of binarism and opposition had already merged into the Chinese intellectual 
subliminal, a result of the mainly unilateral communication across cultural boundaries. 
Such ideas have constituted part of our knowledge structure, preparing the Chinese 
mind for its ready acceptance of Marxism, Leninism, Mao's re-interpretation of 
Hegelian dialectics and, after the adoption of the open-door policy, theories of 
European textual revolution that have obtained their international license in the 
academic supermarket of North America. 
     Ambiguity as a particular social phenomenon regained favor in the 1990s. It is 
not accidental. Ten years (1979-1989) had been devoted to what is called, by the 
Chinese academia, 'new enlightenment.' This decade is an important historical period 
during which 'Mr. Democracy' and 'Mr. Science' acted as the heroes of the time and 
people turned a deaf ear to familiar ideological monologue. Forbidden ideas rushed in 
to bring to the surface all kinds of forbidden desires. With the help of poststructualism 
and deconstructionism, people have come to understand that criticism against ideology 
is itself ideological, that humanism in the Enlightenment's sense has its own problems
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and that monistic reductionism is the cognitive source of political totalitarianism. Moral 
idealism, a cohesive force for a nation that has worked effectively for over 2000 years, 
received rigorous investigation and vehement attack. Hard-liners described the new 
enlightenment as bourgeois liberalization with a view toward re-shaping China through 
an insidious peaceful evolution. Subtle debates have taken place, one after another, in 
which the main focus has been the cultivation of a whole new generation capable of 
unfamiliarizing what is supposed to have been familiar. Distancing from ideology shifts 
to distancing from clarity. A cognitive re-orientation starts. This tendency keeps 
growing, owing to the unexpected Tien An Men Square demonstrations. Since then, 
literary caricature substitutes for political outcry. Best-sellers in the early 1990s employ 
the officially favored techniques of realism, but create a life space in which the noble is 
obscene and the stupid is full of wisdom. Intellectuals portrayed by intellectuals in 
novels and short stories enjoy self-exposure and self-effacement. Readers cannot tell 
what the hero stands for, saint or devil. Hard-liners are intellectually unprepared for this 
new phenomenon and have to pass it over in silence. Literary critics find a golden 
opportunity and comparative literature becomes the academic vogue though it has 
fallen to a low ebb in the West. In the meanwhile, MTV provides another kind of 
spiritual civilization for every Chinese family. A typical Chinese music television 
offering is often a condensation of three elements: familiar or revolutionary music; 
lyrics irrelevant to the original music and sometimes ungrammatical or nonsensical; 
human figures, most likely sexy and half-naked ladies, who have nothing to do with the 
music or the words. Parallel to this pop cultural audio-visual mish mash is grand 
performances organized by the ideological authorities where different forms, styles, 
genres, themes, narrative apparatuses, stories, etc. are strung together to present a multi-
oriented spectacular. Copycat performances are countless and the whole country is now 
burdened down with pastiched artifacts. It is a process of nationwide unfamiliarization. 
Nevertheless, people do not feel estranged or shocked, because what has brought about 
this paradigmatic mutation or sudden "rupture" are not things such as abstract 
paintings, poems like The Waste Land, nor a Derridean style of writing 'sous nature,' 
but a powerful amusement industry that appeals to the common denominator and aims 
to get in touch the subliminal of the masses. The industry entertains people with 
ambiguity and makes reductionist interpretation impossible. When all this is subsumed 
under the master concept of Chinese socialism or spiritual civilization, propaganda 
itself proves to be ambiguous. Of course, ambiguity in this sense should not be taken 
for granted, no matter the extent to which it might have contributed to the positive re-
shaping of contemporary Chinese life.
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Epilogue
     Structuralist anthropology and semiotics attempt to re-interpret the theory of 
dialectical opposition by introducing a third term, the mediator, which is somewhat 
different from the Hegelian synthesis we understand as familiar. Hermes, Harlequin, 
picaresque characters, circus clowns, tricksters, fools, madmen, the mythical hare, are 
some of the candidates available to act out the function of being an intermediary. 
Sometimes, according to the famous Japanese semiotician Masao Yamaguchi, 
mediation can also be carried out in the form of technique (i.e. prium). To put them all 
in a synchronic perspective, one can construct an archetype of ambiguous and 
equivocal characters that, in turn, finds expression through various images. To follow 
the terminology of Kantian philosophy or Saussurean linguistics, this archetype works 
as a special kind of transcendental subject or 'la langue' which is logically a priori and 
constitutes a necessary condition-but not the necessary and sufficient condition--for 
the possibility of ambiguity in the form of various happenings, that is, experience or 'la 
parole,' in specific temporal-spatial situations. Methodologically, archetype still 
remains within the dichotomy of 'la langue' and 'la parole.' This is an important point to 
make, because there is no graphic/phonetic differentiation in Chinese between langage 
and langue. With this in mind, we can say that a semiotics of the mediator has 
undeniable merits when ambiguity is treated within a relatively closed text to clarify its 
structural features. Focusing on an individual image in a historical situation cannot do 
that. The function exercised by the mediator as an archetype is also very illuminating. It 
helps to push back our horizons and re-construct our understanding of dialectical 
opposition. Given the focus of the present article, however, I find it necessary to move 
beyond the structuralist/semiotic boundary and enter into the area of social practices. 
     If we should locate the power, outside the semiotic systems where the two 
events I have described happen, power that "mediates subversive elements to the 
existing pattern of narrative, transforming the structure so that it can incorporate non-
normative reality," as Masao Yamaguchi has remarked, then that power is none other 
than the booming industry of culture. In other words, the market economy plays the 
role of the mediator. Its motivation is absolutely irrational, an insatiable desire for 
profit, while its mechanism is well equipped with 'instrumental rationality,' as Max 
Weber would have it, and high-technology. Its nature is indeed ambiguous: a blend of 
rationality and irrationality, wisdom and stupidity, order and chaos. A semiosis of this 
impersonal force has yet to be investigated. Nevertheless, it is crystal-clear that 
ambiguity stimulated by this powerful mediator or archetype is linked in one way or 
another to cultural reification, commodification of knowledge, the programmed
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optimization of the relationship between input and output, human alienation that 
hypnotizes the critical faculty of the mind, and the principle that money talks. When 
eclecticism or the mixing up of different code systems obscures the arbitrary distinction 
between God and the Devil (The Misplacement of Symbols), defamiliarizes the 
established myth (Neo-San Zi Jing) and provides a new grammar for the re-ordering of 
syntagmatic relationships, China still doesn't know what the new is and how the re-
ordering will be carried out. China is only at the level of ambiguity for ambiguity's 
sake. 'Great fun and nothing else,' the students' response, implies a refusal to select, to 
choose, to judge and to criticize; an invisible hand has made and controlled everything 
for us. It coincides with poststructuralist celebration of the 'decenterization of the 
subject' and the neo-Marxist acceptance of the 'decentered totality,' as Fredric Jameson 
has remarked. All this meets the requirements of the market economy as an impersonal 
force. 
     If humanism were really dead, what else would be left in human life? In this 
sense, ambiguity cannot afford to be treated solely as an ahistorical archetype. Since the 
action of signs is endless, ambiguity has to be constantly exposed to critical 
examination in a wider context. As a cultural phenomenon, it is not innocent. 
Ambiguity as a re-structuring force is itself ambiguous.
Notes
1. Linguistic determinism results, as Umberto Eco points out in The Absent Structure, from 
      "ontological structuralism" which
, to follow Greimas' structuralist semantics, "must be put 
      between brackets." Winfried Noth gives a brief account of their arguments in Handbook of 
      Semiotics, p.196-197. But, cognitively speaking, determinism, either linguistic or economic, 
      it seems to me, originates from a logical fallacy I have mentioned: inflating a necessary 
      condition illegitimately into a necessary and sufficient condition by what Derrida describes 
      as "metaphysical desire." Kant and Saussure did not make such a mistake. 
2. In Positions (p.28) Derrida argues to the effect that it is differance as "the production of a system 
      of differences" that makes the dissociation of langue and parole possible. Differance or trace 
      thus actually explains, a priori, both signification through exclusion in a delimited system 
      and diachronical movements or changes outside that system. In other words, he wishes to 
      prove that the production of meaning is at once synchronical and diachronical, which 
      merges into differance or trace. Of course, he will not say that this text-centered third term 
      has replaced the Hegelian "universal subject" (the universal spirit) as the synthesizer. 
3. Here I have in mind Austin's Speech Act Theory, Wittgenstein's 'language game' and its 'rule,' 
      Foucault's 'archaeology,' Jonathan Culler's 'literary convention,' 'New Historicism' in North 
      America and British 'Cultural Materialism.' Their ways of abstracting are very much similar 
      to Saussure's synchronical approach to language but fail to stress that their theories are not 
      sufficient but only necessary.
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4. How all kinds of 'parole' are possible or how 'langue' is logically a priori is a typical Kantian 
      question. Synchronical' is transcendental in the form of linguistics. 
5. Discourse, figure, p.75. The English translation is quoted from Bill Readings' Introducing 
      Lyotard, Routledge, 1991 
6. The idea of the mediator as a third term and quotations from Yamaguchi are re-quoted from 
      Imafuku, Ryuta.1988. "Masao Yamaguchi: A Hermes-Harlequin in the Field of Semiotics," 
      The Semiotic Web 1987, ed. T.A. Sebeok, Mouton de Gruyter.
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